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Abstract 
Under nonlinear road pricing (or tolling), the price charged is not strictly proportional to the distance travelled inside 
a tolling area, the generalized travel cost is not link-wise additive, and finding a user equilibrium distribution is 
typically formulated as a complementarity problem.  The latter is a difficult problem to solve in mathematical 
programming.  In this paper, we use piecewise linear functions to determine tolls and show that finding a user 
equilibrium distribution with such functions can be formulated as a convex optimization problem that is based on 
path flows and solvable by traditional algorithms such as simplicial decomposition.  For area-based and two-part 
pricing schemes, the tolling function consists of only one linear piece and finding a user equilibrium distribution 
reduces to a convex optimization problem formulated in terms of link flows and solvable by any software for 
linearly constrained convex programs. 
To find an optimal pricing scheme, e.g., one that maximizes the social benefit, we formulate the problem as a 
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, an optimization problem that is generally non-convex and 
difficult to solve.  However, it is possible to use search algorithms to find an optimal scheme because the number of 
parameters in our piecewise linear function is few.  To illustrate, we use a coordinate search algorithm to find an 
optimal two-part pricing scheme for a small network with randomly generated data. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Nonlinear pricing generally refers to a case in which the price or tariff is not strictly proportional to the quantity 
purchased.  Economists have been studying such pricing since the discussion of its manifestations in Dupuit (1894) 
and the later categorization of the phenomenon in Pigou (1920). Today, nonlinear pricing is prevalent in many 
industries.  For example, railroad tariffs generally depend on the weight, volume, and distance of each shipment.  
However, those using full-cars and/or over long distances often receive discounts.  The price per kilowatt-hour of 
electricity is different for different types of users.  Heavy users during peak hours generally pay higher rates.  
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Airlines routinely offer discount tickets for advance purchase, with non-cancellation restriction, and in competitive 
markets.  In each of these examples, the average price paid per unit varies depending on characteristics of the 
purchase such as its size, time of usage, and restrictions.   
In practice, road pricing is often nonlinear.  The tolls in, e.g., Singapore (Menon et al., 1993), London (Santos 
and Shaffer, 2004), and Stockholm (Stockholmsforsoket, 2006) are not proportional to the distance travelled inside 
the tolling areas.  In Stockholm, tolls are also not proportional to the number of times a user enters the tolling area.  
The amount of tolls paid on a given day is limited to SEK 60.  After paying this maximum amount, users can freely 
enter the tolling area for the rest of the day.  For its congestion charge, London offers monthly and annual passes to 
frequent users at an approximately 15% discount.  Similarly, the Dulles Greenway’s VIP Frequent Rider Program 
gives rebates to users with high mileage.  During phase I of its Value Pricing Project on Interstate 15, San Diego 
sold $50 monthly permits that allow single occupancy vehicles to use lanes reserved for high occupancy vehicles.  
(During phase II, the permits were replaced by tolls.)   
Despite its widespread use, the literature on nonlinear road pricing is limited.  De Borger (2001) proposes a 
discrete choice model to study optimal two-part tariffs in the presence of externalities.  In their nonlinear pricing 
study, Wang et al. (2011) consider three questions: which nonlinear pricing scheme (among the five they consider) 
is most profitable, how does the most profitable choice depend on congestion, and does usage-only pricing 
necessarily denominate other nonlinear schemes if congestion is severe?  Both De Borger (2001) and Wang et al. 
(2011) opine that nonlinear pricing has been largely overlooked in the literature.  Separate from the previous two 
papers, Gabriel and Bernstein (1997a) formulate the problem of finding a user equilibrium (UE) distribution on 
general road networks (or, more simply, the UE problem) when travel costs are not link-wise additive as a nonlinear 
complementarity problem or NCP.  In their formulation, one component of the path travel cost is a nonlinear 
function of its travel distance.  To solve their UE problem, Gabriel and Bernstein (1997a) propose an algorithm 
based on nonsmooth equations and sequential quadratic programming (see also Gabriel and Bernstein, 1997b).  Lo 
and Chen (2000) consider a similar problem and convert their NCP into an unconstrained optimization problem 
based on a merit function.  More recently, Agdeppa et al. (2007) modify the model in Gabriel and Bernstein (1997a) 
by introducing a disutility function and formulate the problem as a monotone mixed complementarity problem 
instead.  Maruyama and Harata (2006) and Maruyama and Sumalee (2007) propose an algorithm for area-based 
pricing, one form of nonlinear pricing.  The authors of the last two papers observe that area-based pricing is not link-
wise additive and it may be intuitive to conclude that there exists no equilibrium condition based on link flows.  As 
demonstrated below, this intuition is incorrect.  
This paper considers nonlinear pricing in the context of managing travel demand, reducing congestion, and, 
perhaps, lessening the environmental impact in a tolling area. Although it is common to assume that a tolling area 
consists of connected roads or roads in a connected geographical area, such an assumption is unnecessary.  For 
example, a tolling area can consist of not necessarily connected roads or highways that are under the jurisdiction of a 
single entity (a government agency or private company).  It is also possible to let the tolling area be the entire road 
network and every road user must pay tolls.  Doing so reduces our problem to the one addressed in Gabriel and 
Bernstein (1977a). 
In this paper, the amount of toll that users pay, ܶሺκሻ, varies nonlinearly with κǡ the distance travelled inside the 
tolling area.  (Henceforth, ܶሺκሻ is also referred to as the tolling or pricing function.)  We assume that ܶሺκሻ is 
piecewise linear and the number of linear pieces is two or less.  As observed in Wilson (1993), a piecewise linear 
function with a small number of linear pieces is easier to understand, thus more practical, and can realize most of the 
advantages of general nonlinear pricing functions.  As demonstrated below, the UE problem with piecewise linear 
pricing functions reduces to an optimization problem that is similar to the standard UE problem (see, e.g., Florian 
and Hearn, 2003) and solvable by well-known algorithms such as simplicial decomposition.  For area-based and 
two-part pricing schemes, both user equilibrium conditions and the UE problem can be formulated in term of link 
flows despite the fact that the generalized cost is not link-wise additive.  Solving the link-based UE problem 
eliminates the need to maintain information about individual paths and typically requires less computational 
resources.  In fact, the UE problem with area-based and two-part pricing schemes can be solved by any software for 
linearly constrained convex programs. 
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To our knowledge, there has been little or no attempt to find an optimal nonlinear pricing scheme for a general 
road network.  To find an optimal scheme, De Borger (2001) assumes that the travel demand is measured in 
kilometres without an explicit road network.  Similarly, Wang et al. (2011) consider a network with only one link.  
In this paper, we formulate the problem of finding a nonlinear pricing scheme that, e.g., maximizes the social benefit 
as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints.  We demonstrate that such a problem can be solved using a 
search algorithm when the tolling function is piecewise linear. 
For the remainder, Section 2 describes the pricing functions considered in this paper.  Section 3 defines our 
notation and states path-based UE conditions for later reference.  Section 4 formulates the UE problem in terms of 
path flows and modifies simplicial decomposition to find a UE flow-demand pair under our nonlinear pricing 
functions.  Section 5 states link-based UE conditions and discusses when these conditions are equivalent to those 
based on paths. Section 6 presents a search algorithm for finding optimal pricing parameters, e.g., those that 
maximize the social benefit.  Finally, Section 7 studies numerical results from a small road network with randomly 
generated data and Section 8 concludes the paper.  To illustrate the simplicity of using link-based conditions and 
problems, the Appendix gives a version of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm (a well-known algorithm for linearly 
constrained convex programs) for solving the UE problem with two-part pricing. 
2. Nonlinear pricing functions 
The tolling function, ܶሺκሻ, in this paper is of the form: 
 
ܶሺκሻ ൌ ൜ܶ
௠௜௡ሺκሻܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻǡ κ ൐ Ͳ
Ͳǡ κ ൑ Ͳ 
 
where ܶ௠௜௡ሺκሻ ൌ ሼߚଵ ൅ ߤଵκǡ ߚଶ ൅ ߤଶκሽ and ܶ୫ୟ୶ሺκሻ ൌ ሼߚଵ ൅ ߤଵκǡ ߚଶ ൅ ߤଶκሽ.  Recall that κ is the distance 
travelled inside the tolling area. (Herein, distances are measured in miles and we refer to a rate or fee based on miles 
travelled as a “VMT fee”, where VMT is an abbreviation for “vehicle-mile travelled.”) In both ܶ௠௜௡ሺκሻ  and 
ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ , ߤଵ  and ߤଶ  are nonnegative VMT fees. Typically, ߚଵ  and ߚଶ  are nonnegative.  However, one may be 
negative to reproduce some tolling functions in practice more accurately.  (See the discussion about three-part tariffs 
below.)    
Both ܶ௠௜௡ሺκሻ and ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ are piecewise linear functions with two linear pieces.  Although the number of linear 
pieces can be larger, i.e., ܶ௠௜௡ሺκሻ ൌ ሼߚଵ ൅ ߤଵκǡڮ ǡ ߚ௡ ൅ߤ௡κሽ and ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ ൌ ሼߚଵ ൅ ߤଵκǡڮ ǡ ߚ௡ ൅ߤ௡κሽ, 
where ݊ ൒ ʹ, we set ݊ ൌ ʹ in this paper for two reasons.  First, the results for ݊ ൌ ʹ can be extended to the cases 
with larger ݊ without much difficulty.  As cautioned in Wilson (1993), the second reason is that large ݊ is often not 
practical.  Pricing functions with many linear pieces generally result in tolling schemes too complex for motorists to 
understand and respond properly.  Moreover, pricing functions with only a few linear pieces can typically capture 
most of the benefits offered by those with many. 
When ߚଵǡ ߤଵǡ ߚଶ  and ߤଶ  are chosen appropriately, ܶ୫୧୬ሺκሻ  and ܶ୫ୟ୶ሺκሻ  capture common nonlinear pricing 
functions in the economics and road pricing literature (see, e.g., Wilson, 1993 and Wang et al., 2011).  Figure 2.1 
displays tolling functions based on ܶ௠௜௡ሺκሻ.  In case (a), the VMT fee for a longer distance (ߤଶ) is smaller than the 
one for a shorter distance (ߤଵ), i.e., heavy road users receive discounts.  Case (b) allows users to either pay a VMT 
fee at a rate ߤଵ or a fixed fee, ߚଶ, for unlimited travel inside the tolling area. The former is more economical when 
the travel distance is sufficiently short, i.e., less than the point where ߤଵκ ൌ ߚଶ .  Although both cases may be 
suitable for many industries, it is not clear that they would be adopted for congestion mitigation.   
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Figure 2.1: Pricing functions based on ܶ୫୧୬ሺκሻ 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Pricing functions based on ܶ୫ୟ୶ሺκሻ 
For the pricing functions based on ܶ୫ୟ୶ሺκሻ in Figure 2.2, case (a) requires users to pay two fees.  One is an 
access fee (ߚଵ) and the other is a VMT fee (ߤଵሻ.  Economists commonly refer to this form of pricing as a two-part 
tariff or pricing scheme.  Similarly, the function in case (b) also consists of an access and VMT fee.  However, the 
latter only applies when the travel distance exceeds a threshold, a point where ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵκ ൌ ߚଶ.  (When ߚଶ and ߤଵ are 
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fixed, ߚଵ may need to be negative to achieve a desired threshold value.)  In economics, some refer to case (b) as a 
three-part tariff.  Instead of giving discounts to heavy users, case (c) discourages heavy road usage by charging a 
higher VMT fee ሺߤଵሻ when the travel distance exceeds a threshold, a point where ߚଵ ൅ߤଵκ ൌ ߚଶ ൅ߤଶκ.  Finally, 
the pricing function for case (d) is suitable for area-based pricing (see, e.g., Maruyama and Sumalee, 2007), a tolling 
scheme under which users can enter and use the tolling area as often and as much as they like during a specified 
period after paying an access fee, ߚଵ.  (Area-based pricing is different from cordon pricing.  For the latter, users 
generally pay a fee each time they enter the tolling area.)  In addition to those shown in the two figures, settingߚଵǡ
ߚଶ, and ߤଶ to zero reduces ܶሺκሻ to linear pricing, i.e., ܶሺκሻ ൌ ߤଵκ. 
3. Path-based user equilibrium conditions under nonlinear pricing 
This section states UE conditions under nonlinear pricing using path flows.  Doing so allows us to define our 
notation and provide information for discussion in subsequent sections. 
Let   be the set of links (or arcs) in the road network.  A link in   is denoted as ܽ or a pair ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ, where ݅ and ݆ 
are nodes corresponding to the start and end of a road segment.  For travel demands, ܭ denotes the set of origin-
destination (OD) pairs and ݀௞ is the demand for OD pair ݇ א ܭ.  Associated with each OD pair, there is an inverse 
demand function ܦ௞ିଵሺڄሻ.  Additionally, ࢊ א ܴାȁ௄ȁ and ࡰିଵሺڄሻ א ܴାȁ௄ȁ are vectors of these demands and their inverse 
functions, respectively. (Herein, the bold typeface indicates vectors of variables or functions and the plus sign in the 
subscript indicates that each component of the vector is nonnegative.)  
To satisfy demands, ܲ௞ denotes the set of all possible paths for OD pair ݇.  Then, ௥݂௞ represents the number of 
travellers using path ݎ א ܲ௞  and ࢌ is a vector of these path flows.  Then, the set of all feasible flow-demand pairs, 
ሺࢌǡ ࢊሻ, can be described as follows: 
ܸ௙ ൌ ൝ሺࢌǡ ࢊሻǣ ෍ ௥݂௞
௥א௉ೖ
ൌ ݀௞ǡ ௥݂௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ݀௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊݇ א ܭǡ ݎ א ܲ௞ൡǤ 
In words, ሺࢌǡ ࢊሻ is a feasible flow-demand pair if the sum of the flows on all paths connecting the origin of OD pair 
݇ to its destination equals ݀௞ and both ࢌ and ࢊ are nonnegative.  It is also convenient to refer to a flow-demand pair 
as ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ, where ࢜ a vector of the aggregate link flows, ݒ௔.  By letting ߜ௔௥ ൌ ͳ if arc ܽ is on path ݎ and ߜ௔௥ ൌ Ͳ 
otherwise, it is possible to describe ܸ௙ as follows: 
ܸ௙ ൌ ൝ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻǣݒ௔ ൌ ෍ ෍ ߜ௔௥ ௥݂௞
௥א௉ೖ௞
ǡ ෍ ௥݂௞
௥א௉ೖ
ൌ ݀௞ǡ ௥݂௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ݀௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊݇ א ܭǡ ݎ א ܲ௞ൡǤ 
We use both definitions of ܸ௙ interchangeably throughout this paper and refer the elements of ܸ௙ either as ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ or 
ሺࢌǡ ࢊሻ. 
Associated with each arc, there is a travel time or link performance function, ݏ௔ሺڄሻ, and ࢙ሺڄሻ א ܴାା௅  is a vector of 
these functions, where ܮ is the cardinality of   and the “++” sign in the subscript indicates that each component of 
the vector is positive.  In addition, ݈௔  denotes the length of arc ܽ  and ݈௔  > 0 for all ܽ א   .  For tolling,    is 
partitioned into two subsets,  ଵ and  ଶ, where the former contains links inside the tolling area and the later consists 
of those outside.  By definition,  ଵ ת  ଶ ൌ ׎ and   ൌ  ଵ ׫  ଶ.  As mentioned previously, arcs in  ଵ need not be 
connected.  Similarly, ܲ௞ is divided into two subsets: ܶܲ௞ and ܰܲ௞.  The former, ܶܲ௞, consists of paths containing 
arcs in  ଵ and using these paths requires paying tolls.  In general, paths in ܶܲ௞  contain links in both  ଵ and  ଶ to 
connect the origin of OD pair ݇ to its destination.  On the other hand, paths in ܰܲ௞ contain no link in  ଵ and are 
thus toll-free.  Given a pricing function ܶሺڄሻ, ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ א ܸ௙ is in tolled UE if the following conditions hold: 
Siriphong Lawphongpanich et al. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 17 (2011) 292–315 297
ܶ ൭෍ ߜ௔௥݈௔
௔אఆభ
൱ ൅෍ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔אఆ
ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ ׊ݎ א ܶ ାܲା௞ ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻǡ ݇ א ܭǡ ሺʹǤͳሻ
ܶ ൭෍ ߜ௔௥݈௔
௔אఆభ
൱ ൅෍ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔אఆ
൒ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ ׊ݎ א ܶ ଴ܲ௞ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻǡ ݇ א ܭǡ ሺʹǤʹሻ
෍ ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔אఆమ
ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ ׊ݎ א ܰ ାܲା௞ ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻǡ ݇ א ܭǡ ሺʹǤ͵ሻ
෍ ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔אఆమ
൒ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ ׊ݎ א ܰ ଴ܲ௞ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻǡ ݇ א ܭǤ ሺʹǤͶሻ
 
In (2.1), ܶ ାܲା௞ ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ  denotes the set of utilized toll paths with respect to ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ א ܸ௙ , i.e., ܶ ାܲା௞ ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ ൌ
ሼݎ א ܶܲ௞ǣ ௥݂௞ ൐ Ͳǡ ݎ א ܲ௞ሽ .  Similarly, ܶ ଴ܲ௞ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ  in (2.2) is the set of paths not utilized and ܶ ଴ܲ௄ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ ൌ
ሼݎ א ܶܲ௞ǣ ௥݂௞ ൌ Ͳǡ ݎ א ܲ௞ሽ.  In (2.3) and (2.4), ܰ ାܲା௞ ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ and ܰ ଴ܲ௞ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ are similarly defined for toll-free paths.  
The expression on the left hand side of (2.1) and (2.2) consists of the toll amount and travel time for path ݎ א ܶܲ௞.  
(In this paper, tolls are measured in units of time.)  Because paths in ܰܲ௞ are toll free, their costs or the summations 
on the left hand side of (2.3) and (2.4) consist solely of travel times.  In words, (2.1) and (2.3) state that, at 
equilibrium, all utilized paths (toll or not) must have the same generalized cost that equals to the value of the inverse 
demand function evaluated at the “realized” demand ݀௞.  Conditions (2.2) and (2.4) imply that the costs of those not 
utilized cannot be lower than ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ.  
When ܶሺڄሻ is nonlinear, the generalized cost expressions on the left hand side of conditions (2.1) and (2.2) are not 
link-wise additive and it may be intuitive to conclude that tolled UE conditions based on link flows do not exist (see, 
e.g., Maruyama and Sumalee, 2007).  However, results in Section 5 show otherwise. 
To simplify our presentation and highlight key ideas, assume that ݏ௔ሺڄሻ is a function only of ݒ௔, i.e., the Jacobian 
of ࢙ሺ࢜ሻ is diagonal.  Under this assumption, finding a toll-free equilibrium flow-demand pair reduces to a convex 
optimization problem.  An extension to, e.g., the case with an asymmetric and positive definite Jacobian is 
straightforward and generally involves finding solutions to variational inequalities or VIs (see, e.g., Florian and 
Hearn, 2003, and Patriksson, 1994).  In addition, ܦ௞ିଵሺڄሻ  is assumed to be non-increasing and Ͳ ൑ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀ሻ ൏
λǡ ׊݀ ൒ ͲǤ  
Henceforth, we assume that ܶሺκሻ is based on ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ, a function more suitable for managing travel demand, 
reducing congestion, and lessening the environmental impacts.  Although most discussion and many results herein 
extend in an obvious manner to the case with ܶ௠௜௡ሺκሻ, the resulting optimization problems and VIs generally 
minimize a non-convex objective function and are defined with functions whose Jacobians are indefinite, 
respectively.  Solving such optimization problems with, e.g., commercial software may not yield globally optimal 
solutions and VIs with indefinite Jacobians are not well solved (see, e.g., Facchinei and Pang, 2003). 
4. Finding an equilibrium flow-demand pair using path flows 
This section assumes that ܶሺκሻ is based on ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ defined in Section 2 and modifies traditional algorithms 
such as simplicial decomposition (see, e.g., von Hohenbalken, 1977, Lawphongpanich and Hearn, 1984, Hearn et 
al., 1987, and Patriksson, 1994) to find a UE flow-demand pair.  This is advantageous for two reasons.  The 
underlying concepts in traditional algorithms are well understood and, as demonstrated below, they work well when 
ܶሺκሻ is defined with ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ.  The former also makes the software development easier because existing computer 
programs for traditional algorithms can be modified to include nonlinear pricing. 
For each path ݎ א ܲ௞, its travel distance inside the tolling area, σ ߜ௔௥݈௔௔א భ , is fixed.  Thus, the toll, ߬௥, for path ݎ 
is also fixed.  Specifically, ߬௥ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ݎ א ܰܲ௞ǡ and ߬௥ ൌ ܶሺσ ߜ௔௥݈௔௔אఆభ ሻ is nonnegative for all ݎ א ܶܲ௞.  Then, the 
tolled user equilibrium (TUE) problem, i.e., the problem of finding a UE flow-demand pair with a given pricing 
function ܶሺڄሻ, can be formulated in terms of path flows as follows: 
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ܷܶܧǣ ݉݅݊ ෍න ݏ௔ሺ߱ሻ݀߱
௩ೌ
଴௔א 
െ෍න ܦ௞ିଵሺ߱ሻ݀߱
ௗೖ
଴௞א௄
൅෍ ෍ ߬௥ ௥݂௞
௥א௉ೖ௞א௄
ݏǤ ݐǤ ෍ ௥݂௞
௥א௉ೖ
െ ݀௞ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊݇ א ܭ
ݒ௔ ൌ෍ ෍ ߜ௔௥ ௥݂௞
௥א௉ೖ௞
ǡ ׊ܽ א  
௥݂
௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊݇ א ܭǡ ݎ א ܲ௞

 
Without the last term in the objective function, the above problem reduces to a problem for finding a (toll-free) UE 
flow-demand pair when demands are elastic (see, e.g., Florian and Hearn, 2003).  Under the assumptions stated at 
the end of Section 3, the functions in the first and second summations in the objective are convex.  The last 
summation calculates the toll revenue and is linear with respect to ௥݂௞, the path-flow variables.  The two main sets of 
constraints ensure feasibility and convert path flows into aggregate link flows.  Moreover, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 
or KKT conditions (see, e.g., Bazaraa et al., 2006) are both necessary and sufficient for TUE because it is a linearly 
constrained convex program. Using the fact that ߬௥ ൌ ܶሺσ ߜ௔௥݈௔௔אఆభ ሻ and ܲ௞ ൌ ܶܲ௞ ׫ ܰܲ௞ǡ ׊݇ א ܭ, it is relatively 
simple to demonstrate that the KKT conditions for TUE reduce to (2.1) – (2.4).  Thus, an optimal solution to TUE is 
a UE flow-demand pair under the pricing function ܶሺڄሻ.
Below is a version of simplicial decomposition (SD) that generates the necessary paths between every OD pair.  
(For other variations, see, e.g., Lawphongpanich and Hearn, 1984, and Hearn et al., 1987.)  Briefly, the algorithm 
starts with a zero flow-demand pair in Step 1 (i.e., there is no travel demand initially) and solves an optimization 
problem to generate new paths in Step 2 for all OD pairs.  In Step 3, the algorithm stops when paths generated in 
Step 2 cannot further reduce the objective value of TUE.  If the algorithm does not stop, Step 4 adds paths from Step 
2 to ȫ௞, the set of indices associated with the generated paths for OD pair ݇.  Typically, ȫ௞ ؿ ܲ௞ǡ ׊݇ א ܭ.  In Step 
5, the algorithm solves an approximate version of TUE in which ܲ௞ is replaced by ȫ௞ and returns to Step 2 where 
the process repeats. 
Simplicial Decomposition for TUE 
Step 1:  Set ሺ࢜ଵǡ ࢊଵሻ ൌ ሺͲǡ Ͳሻ and ݊ ൌ ͳ.  For each OD pair ݇, set ȫ௞ ൌ ׎ and ݎ௞ ൌ ͳ. 
Step 2: For each OD pair ݇, let ሺࢠ௞ǡ ݓ௞ሻ solve the following (sub)problem and ܿ௞ denotes its optimal objective 
value: 
ܿ௞ ൌ ݉݅݊ ෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜௡ሻݖ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ݓ௞
ݏǤ ݐǤ ܣࢠ௞ ൌ ࡱ௞
෍ ݖ௔௞
௔א భ
൑ ܯݍ௞
ߚଵݍ௞ ൅ ߤଵ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞
௔א భ
൑ ݓ௞
ߚଶݍ௞ ൅ ߤଶ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞
௔א భ
൑ ݓ௞
ݍ௞ א ሼͲǡͳሽǡ ݖ௔௞ א ሼͲǡͳሽǡ ׊ܽ א  
 
Step 3: If ܿ௞ െ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௡ሻ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊݇ א ܭ, stop and the current solution ሺ࢜௡ǡ ࢊ௡ሻ is a tolled UE flow-demand pair.  
Otherwise, go to Step 4. 
Step 4:  For each OD pair ݇  such that ܿ௞ െ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௡ሻ ൏ Ͳ , set ߜ௔௥ೖ ൌ ݖ௔௞ǡ ߬௥ೖ ൌ ݓ௞ǡ ȫ௞ ൌ ȫ௞ ׫ ሼݎ௞ሽǡ  and 
ݎ௞ ൌ ݎ௞ ൅ ͳ. 
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Step 5: Let ሺ࢜௡ାଵǡ ࢊ௡ାଵሻ solve the (master) problem below, set ݊ ൌ ݊ ൅ ͳ, and return to Step 2. 
݉݅݊ ෍න ݏ௔ሺ߱ሻ݀߱
௩ೌ
଴௔א 
െ෍න ܦ௞ିଵሺ߱ሻ݀߱
ௗೖ
଴௞א௄
൅෍ ෍ ߬௥ ௥݂௞
௥א௽ೖ௞א௄
ݏǤ ݐǤ ෍ ௥݂௞
௥אஈೖ
െ ݀௞ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊݇ א ܭ
ݒ௔ ൌ෍ ෍ ߜ௔௥ ௥݂௞
௥אஈೖ௞
ǡ ׊ܽ א  
௥݂
௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊݇ א ܭǡ ݎ א ȫ௞

 
In the above, Step 1 uses a zero flow-demand pair to initialize the algorithm.  Subsequently, the link travel times, 
ݏ௔ሺ࢜௡ሻ, in the subproblem in Step 2 (or, more descriptively, the path-generation problem) are free-flow travel time 
during the first iteration, i.e., when ݊ ൌ ͳ.  For each OD pair, the subproblem finds a path with the least generalized 
cost.  The first summation in the objective function computes the path travel time and ݓ௞ is the toll amount.  In the 
first constraint, ܣ is the node-arc incidence matrix of the road network and ࡱ௞ א ܴே is an (input-output) vector with 
exactly two non-zero components.  The component corresponding to the origin node of the OD pair ݇ contains a “1” 
and the one for the destination contains a “െͳ.”  Thus, the first constraint balances the flows into and out of each 
node. The binary variable ݍ௞ in the second constraint indicates whether to pay tolls and ܯ is a sufficiently large 
positive constant, e.g., ܯ ൌ ȁ ଵȁ ൅ ͳ.  Setting ݍ௞ ൌ Ͳ forces ݖ௔௞ to be zero for all ܽ א  ଵ, i.e., the path does not enter 
the tolling area.  With ݍ௞ ൌ Ͳ and ݖ௔௞ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ܽ א  ଵ, the left-hand sides of the next two constraints (the 3rd and 4th 
constraints) reduce to zero.  Consequently, ݓ௞  must be zero to minimize the objective function and the path 
associated with ࢠ௞ is toll-free.  When ݍ௞ ൌ ͳ, ݖ௔௞ for ܽ א  ଵ are allowed to be one, i.e., the path can use links in the 
tolling area, and the combination of the 3rd and 4th constraints ensure that 
 ൜ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞ǡ
௔אఆభ
ߚଶ ൅ ߤଶ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞
௔אఆభ
ൠ ൑ ݓ௞Ǥ 
As before, the inequality “൑” in the above expression must hold at equality to minimize the objective function, i.e., 
ݓ௞ is the toll amount associated with ࢠ௞. 
The stopping criterion in Step 3 ensures that all paths, i.e., those in the current set ȫ௞ and otherwise, cost no less 
than ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௡ሻ.  This implies that no path can lead to a smaller objective value.  Then, the fact that ሺ࢜௡ǡ ࢊ௡ሻ solves 
the master problem ensures, via its KKT conditions, that the solution satisfies the tolled UE conditions.  Also, it is 
more practical to replace the stopping criterion in Step 3 with ܿ௞ െ ܦିଵሺ݀௞௡ሻ ൒ െ߳, where ߳ is a sufficiently small 
positive constant, e.g., ߳ ൌ ͳͲି଺. 
Step 4 adds an additional path to the set ȫ௞ and performs the necessary updates.  Finally, the master problem in 
Step 5 is a convex optimization problem with linear constraints, a class of problems relatively easy to solve.  As 
mentioned previously, the master problem is also an approximation of the TUE problem. 
The above SD algorithm converges to an optimal solution in a finite number of iterations.  The argument is 
similar to those in the literature (see, e.g., Lawphongpanich and Hearn, 1984) and follows from three facts.  First, 
the number of paths without cycles is finite.  (Recall that we assume that the link performance function ݏ௔ሺڄሻ is 
positive for all ܽ א  .  Thus, the solutions to the problem in Step 2 must correspond to paths without cycles.)  
Second, because SD never eliminates paths from ȫ௞, new paths generated in Step 2 must be distinct from those in 
the current ȫ௞.  Finally, the optimal objective value of the master problem strictly decreases at the end of every 
iteration prior to termination because newly added paths in Step 4 satisfy ܿ௞ െ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௡ሻ ൏ Ͳ, i.e., a condition that 
ensures a decrease in the objective value. 
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4.1. Solving the path generating problem in Step 2 
Consider the path-generating problem (PG) in Step 2.  Although it is possible to solve PG as a single problem, 
our numerical experiments indicate that it is more efficient to obtain an optimal solution to PG by solving two 
smaller problems for each OD pair, one contains binary variables and the other does not.  Solving these two 
problems is akin to solving PG twice, once using the tolling area (ݍ௞ ൌ ͳ) and another not using it (ݍ௞ ൌ Ͳ).  Then, 
the better of the two optimal solutions is the solution to PG. 
When ݍ௞ ൌ ͳ, the third constraint in PG becomes σ ݖ௔௞ ൑ ܯ௔א భ .  When ܯ is sufficiently large, the constraint is 
never binding and can be eliminated.  Consequently, PG reduces to the following: 
ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜௡ሻǣ ݉݅݊ ෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜௡ሻݖ௔௞
௔א 
൅ ݓ௞
ݏǤ ݐǤ ܣࢠ௞ ൌ ࡱ௞
ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞
௔אఆభ
൑ ݓ௞
ߚଶ ൅ ߤଶ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞
௔אఆభ
൑ ݓ௞
ݖ௔௞ א ሼͲǡͳሽǡ ׊ܽ א  

The above problem can be viewed as a generalization of a shortest path problem with two side constraints (see, e.g., 
Ahuja et al., 1993), a NP-complete problem.  When compared to other NP-complete problems, our numerical 
experiments indicate that commercial software such as CPLEX (IBM, 2009) can solve ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜௡ሻ  efficiently 
because the 2nd and 3rd constraints can be satisfied easily.  For any binary ࢠ௞ feasible to the first constraint, setting 
ݓ௞ ൌ ሼߚଵ ൅ ߤଵ σ ݈௔ݖ௔௞௔א భ ǡ ߚଶ ൅ ߤଶ σ ݈௔ݖ௔௞ሽ௔אఆభ  yields a pair ሺࢠ௞ǡ ݓ௞ሻ feasible to ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜௡ሻ. 
For the other case (ݍ௞ ൌ Ͳ), we partition ܣ into two submatrices, ܣଵ and ܣଶ, where ܣ௡ is the node-arc incidence 
matrix for the network induced by arcs in  ௡, where ݊ ൌ ͳǡ ʹ.  Thus, ܣ can be written as ሾܣଵǣ ܣଶሿ.  Similarly, we 
also partition ࢠ௞ as follows: 
ࢠ௞ ൌ ቈࢠଵ
௞
ࢠଶ௞
቉Ǥ 
In the above, ࢠଵ௞  is a (sub)vector consisting of variables ݖ௔௞  for ܽ א  ଵ . The similar holds for ࢠଶ௞ .  Under this 
partitioning, the flow-balance constraint becomes ܣଵࢠଵ௞ ൅ ܣଶࢠଶ௞ ൌ ࡱ௞ .  When ݍ௞ ൌ Ͳ, the path cannot enter the 
tolling area. Thus, ࢠଵ௞ ൌ Ͳ and the subproblem in Step 2 reduces to the following because the constraints involving 
arcs in  ଵ are irrelevant and thus eliminated: 
ܷܵܤʹሺ࢜௡ሻǣ ݉݅݊ ෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜௡ሻݖ௔௞
௔אఆమ
ݏǤ ݐǤ ܣଶࢠଶ௞ ൌ ࡱ௞
ݖ௔௞ א ሼͲǡͳሽǡ ׊ܽ א  ଶ

Note that ܣଶ is totally unimodular because it is a submatrix of ܣ, a totally unimodular matrix.  Thus, basic solutions 
to ܣଶࢠଶ௞ ൌ ࡱ௞ are always integral and the binary restriction for ݖ௔௞ is unnecessary.  In other words, ܷܵܤʹሺ࢜௡ሻ can be 
equivalently written as follows: 
ܷܵܤʹܽሺ࢜௡ሻǣ ݉݅݊ ෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜௡ሻݖ௔௞
௔אఆమ
ݏǤ ݐǤ ܣଶࢠଶ௞ ൌ ࡱ௞
ݖ௔௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ܽ א ߗଶ

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Observe that a unit upper bound on ݖ௔௞ is unnecessary in ܷܵܤʹܽሺ࢜௡ሻ because ࡱ௞ implies that there is only one unit 
of flow in the problem.  Instead of solving PG directly, we solve ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜௡ሻ and ܷܵܤʹܽሺ࢜௡ሻ and, between the two 
solutions, the one with a smaller objective value is optimal to PG. 
5. Link-based user equilibrium conditions under nonlinear pricing 
This section investigates properties under which equilibrium conditions and the UE problem can be formulated 
using link flows.  Below, Section 5.1 discusses one such property that relies on the relationship between ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜௡ሻ 
and its dual problem.  (Recall that ܷܵܤͳሺݒ௡ሻ is a problem associated with the PG problem in Step 2 of SD.)  Then, 
Section 5.2 provides two sets of link-based UE conditions.  One is equivalent to (2.1) – (2.4) when ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜௡ሻ has 
no duality gap and the other is only sufficient.  In Section 5.3, we show that equilibrium conditions and the UE 
problem under area-based and two-part pricing schemes can be stated in terms of link flows. 
5.1. Lagrangian dual problems 
In this and subsequent sections, we remove the iteration index, ݊, from ܷܵܤሺ࢜௡ሻ because it is irrelevant.  The 
problem is well defined for any ࢜ such that, for some travel demand vector ࢊ, ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ א ܸ௙. 
For a given OD pair ݇, the Lagrangian dual problem for ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ can be written as follows (see, e.g., Bazaraa et 
al., 2006):  
ܦͳሺ࢜ሻǣ ݉ܽݔ ܮ௩௞ሺߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ࢑ሻ
ݏǤ ݐǤ ߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ௞ ൒ Ͳ
 
where ܮ௩௞ሺߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ࢑ሻ, the Lagrangian function associated with ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ, is defined as follows: 
ܮ௩௞൫ߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ࢑൯ ൌ ݉݅݊ ෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ݓ௞ ൅ ෍ ߙ௠௞ ቌߚ௠ ൅ ߤ௠ ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞
௔אఆభ
െ ݓ௞ቍ
ଶ
௠ୀଵ
ݏǤ ݐǤ ܣࢠ௞ ൌ ࡱ௞
ݖ௔௞ א ሼͲǡͳሽǡ ׊ܽ א ߗǤ

The variables ߙ௠௞ , for ݉ ൌ ͳǡʹ, are Lagrange multipliers constrained to be nonnegative.  In literature, some refer to 
the above problem as a Lagrangian subproblem. 
Let ሺࢠො௞ǡ ݓෝ௞ሻ and ሺߙതଵ௞ǡ ߙതଶ௞ሻ solve ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ  and ܦͳሺ࢜ሻ, respectively.  Then, it follows from the weak duality 
theorem (see, Bazaraa et al., 2006) that: 
෍ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖƸ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ݓෝ௞ ൒ ܮ௩௞ሺߙതଵ௞ǡ ߙതଶ௞ሻǤ 
The result below assumes that the inequality in the above expression holds at equality, i.e., the strong duality 
condition holds or ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ has no or zero duality gap. 
 
Lemma 5.1: If ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ has no duality gap, then its solution also solves the Lagrangian subproblem of ܦͳሺ࢜ሻ. 
 
Proof: As discussed above, let ሺࢠො௞ǡݓෝ௞ሻ and ሺߙതଵ௞ǡ ߙതଶ௞ሻ solve ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ and ܦͳሺ࢜ሻ, respectively.  Then, the following 
must hold: 
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෍ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖƸ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ݓෝ௞ ൌ ܮ௩௞ሺߙതଵ௞ǡ ߙതଶ௞ሻ
ൌ  ൞෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ݓ௞ ൅ ෍ ߙത௠௞ ቌߚ௠ ൅ ߤ௠ ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞
௔אఆభ
െ ݓ௞ቍ
ଶ
௠ୀଵ
ǣ ܣࢠ௞ ൌ ࡱ௞ǡ ݖ௔௞ א ሼͲǡͳሽൢ
൑ ෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖƸ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ݓෝ௞ ൅ ෍ ߙത௠௞ ቌߚ௠ ൅ ߤ௠ ෍ ݈௔ݖƸ௔௞
௔אఆభ
െ ݓෝ௞ቍ
ଶ
௠ୀଵ
൑ ෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖƸ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ݓෝ௞Ǥ
 
In the above, the first two equalities follow from the zero duality gap assumption and the definition of the 
Lagrangian function at the optimal dual solution ሺߙതଵ௞ǡ ߙതଶ௞ሻ, respectively.  Next, the first inequality holds because 
ሺࢠො௞ǡ ݓෝ௞ሻ is feasible to the minimization problem.  When viewed as an optimal solution to ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ, ሺࢠො௞ǡ ݓෝ௞ሻ 
satisfies ൫ߚ௠ ൅ ߤ௠ σ ݈௔ݖƸ௔௞௔אఆభ െ ݓෝ௞൯ ൑ Ͳ  for ݉ ൌ ͳǡʹ .  Combining the latter with the fact that ߙത௠௞ ൒ Ͳ , for 
݉ ൌ ͳǡ ʹ, implies that σ ߙത௠௞ ൫ߚ௠ ൅ ߤ௠ σ ݈௔ݖƸ௔௞௔אఆభ െ ݓෝ௞൯ଶ௠ୀଵ ൑ Ͳ.  Thus, the last inequality must hold.   
The above sequence of equalities and inequalities begins and ends with the same expression.  Thus, the two 
inequalities must be equalities, i.e.,  ሺࢠො௞ǡ ݓෝ௞ሻ must be optimal to the minimization problem, i.e., the Lagrangian 
subproblem of ܦͳሺ࢜ሻ associated with ሺߙതଵ௞ǡ ߙതଶ௞ሻ.  
 
To make a problem structure more evident, observe that ߚ௠ and ߙ௠௞ ǡ ݉ ൌ ͳǡ ʹ, are constants with respect to the 
minimization and the Lagrangian subproblem can be written as 
ܮ௩௞൫ߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ࢑൯ ൌ ሺߙଵ௞ߚଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߚଶሻ ൅ ݉݅݊ ෍ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ݓ௞ሺͳ െ ߙଵ௞ െ ߙଶ௞ሻ ൅ ሺߙଵ௞ߤଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߤଶሻ ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞
௔אఆభ
ݏǤ ݐǤ ܣࢠ௞ ൌ ࡱ௞
ݖ௔௞ א ሼͲǡͳሽǡ ׊ܽ א ߗǤ

In the above, ݓ௞ is unrestricted.  When ߙଵ௞ ൅ ߙଶ௞ ൐ ͳ, ܮ௩௞൫ߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ࢑൯ ൌ െλ because setting ݓ௞ ൌ λ is optimal.  On 
the other hand, when ߙଵ௞ ൅ ߙଶ௞ ൑ ͳ, the optimal value for ݓ௞  is zero and ܮ௩௞൫ߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ࢑൯ is finite.  To maximize the 
value of ܮ௩௞൫ߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ࢑൯ in problem ܦͳሺ࢜ሻ, it makes sense to restrict ߙଵ௞ and ߙଶ௞ to the region where ߙଵ௞ ൅ ߙଶ௞ ൑ ͳ and 
ߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ࢑ ൒ Ͳ.  Thus, the Lagrangian dual problem for ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ can be equivalently written as: 
ܦʹሺ࢜ሻǣ ݉ܽݔ ܮ෨௩௞൫ߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ࢑൯ ൅ ሺߙଵ௞ߚଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߚଶሻ
ݏǤ ݐǤ ߙଵ௞ ൅ ߙଶ࢑ ൑ ͳ
ߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ࢑ ൒ Ͳ

where ܮ෨௩௞൫ߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ࢑൯ is a modified Lagrangian function and, because ܣ is totally unimodular, it can defined as follows: 
ܮ෨௩௞൫ߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ࢑൯ ൌ ݉݅݊ ෍ ሺݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ ൅ ሺߙଵ௞ߤଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߤଶሻ݈௔ሻݖ௔௞
௔אఆభ
൅ ෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖ௔௞
௔אఆమ
ݏǤ ݐǤ ܣࢠ௞ ൌ ࡱ௞
ݖ௔௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ܽ א  
 
We also refer to the problem directly above as the modified Lagrangian subproblem.  Because ܦͳሺ࢜ሻ and ܦʹሺ࢜ሻ are 
equivalent, it follows from Lemma 4.1 that, if ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ has no duality gap, its solution also solves the modified 
Lagrangian subproblem and 
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෍ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖƸ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ݓෝ௞ ൌ ܮ෨௩௞ሺߙതଵ௞ǡ ߙതଶ௞ሻ ൅ ሺߙതଵ௞ߚଵ ൅ ߙതଶ௞ߚଶሻǤ 
5.2. Link-based equilibrium conditions: general case 
For a given ሺࢌǡ ࢊሻ א ܸ௙, define 
ݔ௔௞ሺࢌሻ ൌ෍ ෍ ߜ௔௥ ௥݂௞
௥א்௉ೖ௔אఆ

ݕ௔௞ሺࢌሻ ൌ෍ ෍ ߜ௔௥ ௥݂௞
௥אே௉ೖ௔אఆ

ߪ௞ ൌ෍ ௥݂௞
௥א்௉ೖ

ߟ௞ ൌ෍ ௥݂௞
௥אே௉ೖ
 
In words, ࢞௞ሺࢌሻ and ࢟௞ሺࢌሻ are, respectively, vectors of link flows on toll and toll-free paths associated with ሺࢌǡ ࢊሻ.  
As constructed, ݕ௔௞ሺࢌሻ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ܽ א  ଵǡ ݇ א ܭ, i.e., ࢟ሺࢌሻ is the link-flow vector associated with toll-free paths.  In the 
last two equations, ߪ௞ and ߟ௞ are variables representing the numbers of users who pay and do not pay tolls for OD 
pair ݇, respectively.  For every OD pair ݇, the above vectors and variables satisfy the following linear systems: 
ሾܣଵǣ ܣଶሿ࢞௞ ൌ ߪ௞ࡱ௞
ሾͲǣ ܣଶሿ࢟௞ ൌ ߟ௞ࡱ௞
ߪ௞ ൅ ߟ௞ ൌ ݀௞
 
where, as previously defined, ܣଵ and ܣଶ are node-arc incidence matrices for subnetworks induced by arcs in the sets 
 ଵ and  ଶ, respectively.  
The above motivates a link-based representation of feasible flow-demand pairs based on ࢞௞  and ࢟௞ .  In 
particular, the set of all feasible flow-demand pair can be equilivalently written as 
ܸ௫ ൌ ቐ
ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻǣ ࢜ ൌ෍ ሺ࢞௞ ൅ ࢟௞ሻ
௞א௄
ǡ ݀௞ ൌ ߪ௞ ൅ ߟ௞ǡ ܣ࢞௞ ൌ ߪ௞ࡱ௞ǡ ሾͲǣ ܣଶሿ࢟௞ ൌ ߟ௞ࡱ௞ǡ
࢞௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ࢟௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ߪ௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ߟ௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊݇ א ܭ
ቑǤ 
Because the value of ݕ௔௞, ׊ܽ א  ଵ, is unspecified in the above expression, it is assumed that they are always zero, 
i.e., flows associated with ࢟ do not enter the tolling area.  Later, we also refer to elements of ܸ௫ in a disaggregate 
form or as a quadruplet ሺ࢞ǡ ࢟ǡ ࣌ǡ ࣁሻ א ܸ௫, i.e., we also define ܸ௫ as follows: 
ܸ௫ ൌ ሼሺ࢞ǡ ࢟ǡ ࣌ǡ ࣁሻǣ ܣ࢞௞ ൌ ߪ௞ࡱ௞ǡ ሾͲǣ ܣଶሿ࢟௞ ൌ ߟ௞ࡱ௞ǡ ࢞௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ࢟௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ߪ௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ߟ௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊݇ א ܭሽǤ 
For every ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ  in ܸ௫ , there must exist a pair ൫ࢌሺ࢜ሻǡ ࢊሺ࢜ሻ൯ , not necessarily unique, such that 
ݔ௔௞ ൌ σ σ ߜ௔௥ ௥݂௞ሺ࢜ሻ௥א்௉ೖ௔אఆ , ݕ௔௞ ൌ σ σ ߜ௔௥ ௥݂௞ሺ࢜ሻ௥אே௉ೖ௔אఆ , and ݀௞ሺ࢜ሻ ൌ σ ௥݂௞௥א்௉ೖ ሺ࢜ሻ ൅ σ ௥݂௞௥אே௉ೖ ሺ࢜ሻ . 
Moreover, the pair ሺࢌሺ࢜ሻǡ ࢊሺ࢜ሻሻ also belongs to ܸ௙ and such a pair is said to be compatible with ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ א ܸ௫.  The 
theorem below specifies conditions for equilibrium based on elements in ܸ௫ or link flows.  Its proof relies on the 
zero duality gap assumption and the above relationship between ܸ௫ and ܸ௙. 
 
Theorem 5.2: Assume that ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ has no duality gap.  Then, ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ א ܸ௫ is in tolled UE if and only if, for each 
݇ א ܭ, there exist ࣋௞ א ܴே, ࢽ௞ א ܴே, ߙଵ௞, and ߙଶ௞ such that the following link-based conditions hold: 
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ሺߙଵ௞ߤଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߤଶሻ݈௜௝ ൅ ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞൯ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א  ଵǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൐ Ͳ ሺͷǤͳሻ
ሺߙଵ௞ߤଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߤଶሻ݈௜௝ ൅ ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞൯ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א  ଵǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൌ Ͳ ሺͷǤʹሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞൯ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א  ଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൐ Ͳ ሺͷǤ͵ሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞൯ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א  ଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൌ Ͳ ሺͷǤͶሻ
ሺߙଵ௞ߚଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߚଶሻ ൅ ࡱ௞்࣋௞ ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺߪ௞ ൅ ߟ௞ሻǡ ׊݇ א ܭǣ ࢞௞ ് Ͳ ሺͷǤͷሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߛ௜௞ െ ߛ௝௞൯ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א  ଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݕ௜௝௞ ൐ Ͳ ሺͷǤ͸ሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߛ௜௞ െ ߛ௝௞൯ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א  ଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݕ௜௝௞ ൌ Ͳ ሺͷǤ͹ሻ
ࡱ௞்ࢽ௞ ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺߪ௞ ൅ ߟ௞ሻǡ ׊݇ א ܭǣ ࢟௞ ് Ͳ ሺͷǤͺሻ
ሺߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ௞ሻܦʹሺ࢜ሻǡ ׊݇ א ܭ ሺͷǤͻሻ

Proof: For each ݇ א ܭ, assume that there exist ࣋௞ǡ ࢽ௞ǡ ߙଵ௞, and ߙଶ௞ satisfying conditions (5.1) – (5.9).  Below, we 
show that, for every OD pair ݇ א ܭ, the generalized cost of all utilized routes, toll or toll-free, equal ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ and 
the costs of those not utilized are at least as large. 
Consider a toll-free route that is utilized with respect to any pair ሺࢌሺ࢜ሻǡ ࢊሺ࢜ሻሻ compatible with ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ א ܸ௫, i.e., 
ݎ א ܰ ାܲା௞ ሺࢌሺ࢜ሻǡ ࢊሺ࢜ሻሻ .  If ߜ௔௥ ൌ ͳ , then there must be flows on link ܽ , i.e., ݕ௔௞ሺ࢜ሻ ൐ Ͳ .  Summing together 
expression (5.6) for all ܽ such that ߜ௔௥ ൌ ͳ yields 
Ͳ ൌ ෍ ߜሺ௜ǡ௝ሻ௥ ቀݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߛ௜௞ െ ߛ௝௞൯ቁ
ሺ௜ǡ௝ሻא 
ൌ ෍ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔א 
െ ߛ௢ሺ௞ሻ௞ ൅ ߛௗሺ௞ሻ௞ ൌ ෍ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔א 
െ ࡱ௞்ࢽ௞ ሺͷǤͳͲሻ
 
where ݋ሺ݇ሻ and ݀ሺ݇ሻ denote, respectively, the origin and destination of OD pair ݇.  Thus, σ ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ௔א  ൌ ࡱ௞்ࢽ௞ 
and it follows from (5.8) that σ ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ௔א  ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺߪ௞ ൅ ߟ௞ሻ ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ.  Thus, the cost of path ݎ equals the value 
of the inverse demand function at the realized demand ݀௞ .  When a toll-free route ݎ  is not utilized, i.e., ݎ א
ܰ ଴ܲ௞ሺࢌሺ࢜ሻǡ ࢊሺ࢜ሻሻ, some link on route ݎ  has no flow, i.e., ݕ௔௞ሺ࢜ሻ ൌ Ͳ for some ܽ  such that ߜ௔௥ ൌ ͳ .  For arcs 
satisfying the latter, (5.7) indicates that ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߛ௜௞ െ ߛ௝௞൯ ൒ Ͳ and the following holds: 
 Ͳ ൑ σ ߜሺ௜ǡ௝ሻ௥ ቀݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߛ௜௞ െ ߛ௝௞൯ቁሺ௜ǡ௝ሻא  ൌ σ ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ௔א  െ ߛ௢ሺ௞ሻ௞ ൅ ߛௗሺ௞ሻ௞ ൌ σ ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ௔א  െ ࡱ௞்ࢽ௞. (5.11) 
From above, σ ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ௔א  ൒ ࡱ௞்ࢽ௞ ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ, i.e., the cost of a non-utilized toll-free path cannot be smaller than 
the value of the inverse demand function.  Thus, among the toll-free paths, the utilized ones have costs equal to 
ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ and those not utilized cannot have a lower cost. 
For a toll route ݎ א ܶ ାܲା௞ ሺࢌሺ࢜ሻǡ ࢊሺ࢜ሻሻ, let ݖ௔௞ ൌ ߜ௔௥ǡ ׊ܽ א  .  As constructed, ࢠ௞  is feasible to the modified 
Lagrangian subproblem associated with ܮ෨௩௞൫ߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ࢑൯ at the end of Section 5.1. The dual of this subproblem can be 
written as follows: 
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ݉ܽݔ ࡱ௞
௧ ࣋࢑
ݏǤ ݐǤ ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞ ൑ ሺߙଵߤଵ ൅ ߙଶߤଶሻ݈௜௝ ൅ ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א  ଵ
ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞ ൑ ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א ߗଶ
࣋࢑ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ
 
The hypothesis that ࣋௞ǡ ࢽ௞ǡ ߙଵ௞, and ߙଶ௞ exist ensures that the above dual problem has a solution.  Then, it follows 
from the strong duality theorem in linear programming (see, e.g., Bazaraa et al., 2010) that ܮ෨௩௞ሺߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ௞ሻ ൌ ࡱ௞்࣋௞ and 
both ࢠ௞ and ࣋௞ are optimal to their respective problems.  Because ܦͳሺ࢜ሻ and ܦʹሺ࢜ሻ are equivalent and ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ 
has no duality gap, ܮ෨௩௞ሺߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ௞ሻ ൌ ࡱ௞்࣋௞ and the following holds: 
෍ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻࢠ௔௞
௔א 
൅ ݓ௞ ൌ ܮ௩௞ሺߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ௞ሻ ൌ ܮ෨௩௞ሺߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ௞ሻ ൅ ሺߙଵ௞ߚଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߚଶሻ ൌ ࡱ௞்࣋௞ ൅ ሺߙଵ௞ߚଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߚଶሻǤ 
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In the above, ݓ௞ ൌ ሼߚଵ ൅ ߤଵ σ ݈௔ݖ௔௞ǡ௔א భ ߚଶ ൅ ߤଶ σ ݈௔ݖ௔௞௔א భ ሽ ൌ ܶ௠௔௫ሺσ ݈௔ݖ௔௞௔א భ ሻ  because ሺࢠ௞ǡ ݓ௞ሻ  is 
optimal to ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ.  Replacing ݓ௞ with ܶ௠௔௫ሺσ ݈௔ݖ௔௞௔א భ ሻ in the preceding equation yields 
෍ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻࢠ௔௞
௔א 
൅ ܶ௠௔௫ ൬෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞ǡ
௔א భ
൰ ൌ ࡱ௞்࣋௞ ൅ ሺߙଵ௞ߚଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߚଶሻ ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻǡሺͷǤͳʹሻ 
where the last equality follows from (5.5).  Thus, the cost of a utilized toll path equals ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ. 
When ݎ א ܶ ଴ܲ௞ሺࢌሺ࢜ሻǡ ࢊሺ࢜ሻሻ , letting ݖ௔௞ ൌ ߜ௔௥ǡ ׊ܽ א   , may not yield an optimal solution to the modified 
Lagrangian subproblem.  When the path is not utilized, ݔ௜௝௞ ሺ࢜ሻ may equal zero when ݖ௜௝௞ ൌ ͳ. For such link ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ, 
(5.2) and (5.4) imply that ݖ௜௝௞ ቀሺߙଵ௞ߤଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߤଶሻ݈௜௝ ൅ ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ߩ௜௞ ൅ ߩ௝௞ቁ ൒ Ͳ and ݖ௜௝௞ ൫ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ߩ௜௞ ൅ ߩ௝௞൯ ൒ Ͳ , i.e., the 
complementary slackness condition may not hold and ࢠ௞ may not solve the modified Lagrangian subproblem at the 
end of Section 5.1.  However, because ࢠ௞ is still feasible to the subproblem, the weak duality theorem applies and  
෍ሺݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ ൅ ሺߙଵ௞ߤଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߤଶሻ݈௔ሻݖ௔௞
௔א భ
൅ ෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖ௔௞
௔א మ
൒ ܮ෨௩௞ሺߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ௞ሻ ൌ ࡱ௞்࣋௞Ǥ 
Adding ሺߙଵ௞ߚଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߚଶሻ to both sides of the above and using (5.5) yields 
෍ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖ௔௞
௔א 
൅ ෍ ߙ௠௞ ቌߚ௠ ൅ ߤ௠ ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞
௔אఆభ
ቍ
ଶ
௠ୀଵ
൒ ࡱ௞்࣋௞ ൅ ሺߙଵ௞ߚଵ ൅ ߙଶ௞ߚଶሻ ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻǤ 
Since ሼߚଵ ൅ ߤଵ σ ݈௔ݖ௔௞ǡ௔אఆభ ߚଶ ൅ ߤଶ σ ݈௔ݖ௔௞௔אఆభ ሽ ൒ σ ߙ௠௞ ൫ߚ௠ ൅ ߤ௠ σ ݈௔ݖ௔௞௔אఆభ ൯ଶ௠ୀଵ  when ߙଵ௞ ൅ ߙଶ௞ ൌ ͳ  and 
ߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ௞ ൒ Ͳ, it follows from above that 
෍ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻࢠ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ܶ௠௔௫ ൬෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞ǡ
௔אఆభ
൰ ൒෍ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖ௔௞
௔א 
൅ ෍ ߙ௠௞ ቌߚ௠ ൅ ߤ௠ ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞
௔אఆభ
ቍ
ଶ
௠ୀଵ
൒ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻǤሺͷǤͳ͵ሻ 
Thus, if a toll path is not utilized, its cost is no smaller than ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ.  Finally, it follows from (5.10) – (5.13) that 
any pair ሺࢌሺ࢜ሻǡ ࢊሺ࢜ሻሻ compatible with ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ is in tolled UE. 
For the converse, assume that the flows on toll and toll-free paths are in tolled UE.  For ݎ א ܶ ାܲା௞ ൫ࢌሺ࢜ሻǡ ࢊሺ࢜ሻ൯, 
ݖ௔௞ ൌ ߜ௔௥ǡ ׊ܽ א  , must solve ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ because path ݎ must be one with the least generalized cost by definition.  
The zero duality gap assumption and Lemma 5.1 imply that ࢠ௞ also solves the modified Lagrangian subproblem at 
the end of Section 5.1.  Then, it is easy to show that the optimal dual vector, ࣋௞ǡ associated with the subproblem 
satisfies (5.1) – (5.5) with ሺߙଵ௞ǡ ߙଶ௞ሻ as specified in (5.9).  The similar also holds with ݎ א ܰ ାܲା௞ ൫ࢌሺ࢜ሻǡ ࢊሺ࢜ሻ൯ǡ ࢽ௞ǡ
ܷܵܤʹܽሺ࢜ሻ and (5.6) – (5.8). 
There are also link-based equilibrium conditions without relying on the zero duality gap assumption.  Typically, 
they are only sufficient.  For example, the theorem below provides a set of such conditions.  Unlike the previous 
theorem, there are two set of node potentials, ࣋௞ and ࣒௞, for the link flows ݔ௜௝௞ .   
Theorem 5.3: A pair ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ א ܸ௫  is in tolled UE if there exist ࣋௞ǡ࣒௞ , and ࢽ௞  such that following link-based 
conditions hold: 
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ߤଵ݈௜௝ ൅ ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞൯ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א ߗଵǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൐ Ͳ ሺͷǤͳͶሻ
ߤଵ݈௜௝ ൅ ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞൯ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א ߗଵǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൌ Ͳ ሺͷǤͳͷሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞൯ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א ߗଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൐ Ͳ ሺͷǤͳ͸ሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞൯ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א ߗଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൌ Ͳ ሺͷǤͳ͹ሻ
ߤଶ݈௜௝ ൅ ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫߰௜௞ െ ߰௝௞൯ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א ߗଵǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൐ Ͳ ሺͷǤͳͺሻ
ߤଶ݈௜௝ ൅ ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫߰௜௞ െ ߰௝௞൯ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א ߗଵǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൌ Ͳ ሺͷǤͳͻሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫߰௜௞ െ ߰௝௞൯ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א ߗଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൐ Ͳ ሺͷǤʹͲሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫߰௜௞ െ ߰௝௞൯ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א ߗଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൌ Ͳ ሺͷǤʹͳሻ
݉ܽݔሼߚଵ ൅ ࡱ௞்࣋௞ǡ ߚଶ ൅ ࡱ௞்࣒௞ሽ ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻǡ ׊݇ א ܭǡ ࢞௞ ് Ͳ ሺͷǤʹʹሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߛ௜௞ െ ߛ௝௞൯ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א ߗଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݕ௜௝௞ ൐ Ͳ ሺͷǤʹ͵ሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߛ௜௞ െ ߛ௝௞൯ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א ߗଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݕ௜௝௞ ൌ Ͳ ሺͷǤʹͶሻ
ࡱ௞்ࢽ௞ ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻǡ ׊݇ א ܭǡ ࢟௞ ് Ͳ ሺͷǤʹͷሻ

Proof:  For any ൫ࢌሺ࢜ሻǡ ࢊሺ࢜ሻ൯ compatible with ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ and ݎ א ܶ ାܲା௞ ൫ࢌሺ࢜ሻǡ ࢊሺ࢜ሻ൯, it follows from arguments similar 
to those in Theorem 5.2 that (5.14), (5.16), (5.18), and (5.20) lead to the following: 
ߤଵ ෍ ߜ௔௥݈௔
௔א భ
൅෍ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔א 
ൌ ࡱ௞்࣋௞ 
ߤଶ ෍ ߜ௔௥݈௔
௔אఆభ
൅෍ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔אఆ
ൌ ࡱ௞்࣒௞ 
Substituting the above expressions for ࡱ௞்࣋௞ and ࡱ௞்࣒௞ into (5.22) yields 
݉ܽݔ ൝ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵ ෍ ߜ௔௥݈௔
௔אఆభ
൅෍ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔אఆ
ǡ ߚଶ ൅ ߤଶ ෍ ߜ௔௥݈௔
௔אఆభ
൅෍ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔אఆ
ൡ ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ 
݉ܽݔ ൝ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵ ෍ ߜ௔௥݈௔
௔אఆభ
ǡ ߚଶ ൅ ߤଶ ෍ ߜ௔௥݈௔
௔אఆభ
ൡ ൅෍ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔אఆ
ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ 
ܶ௠௔௫ ൭෍ ߜ௔௥݈௔
௔אఆభ
൱ ൅෍ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔אఆ
ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ 
Similarly, the following must hold 
ܶ௠௔௫ ൭෍ ߜ௔௥݈௔
௔אఆభ
൱൅෍ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔אఆ
൒ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻǡ ׊ݎ א ܶ ଴ܲ௞ 
෍ ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔אఆమ
ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻǡ ׊ݎ א ܰ ାܲା௞ 
෍ ߜ௔௥ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻ
௔אఆమ
൒ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻǡ ׊ݎ א ܰ ଴ܲ௞  
Then, the last four equations imply that the costs for all utilized paths, toll-free or otherwise, equal ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻ and the 
costs of those not utilized cannot be lower, i.e., the tolled equilibrium conditions hold for any ሺࢌሺ࢜ሻǡ ࢊሺ࢜ሻሻ 
compatible with ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ.  
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5.3. Link-based equilibrium conditions: two-part pricing 
This section considers two special cases in nonlinear pricing: area-based and two-part pricing.  Mathematically, 
the latter corresponds to setting ߚଶ and ߤଶ in the tolling function to zero.  Doing so yields ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵκ (see 
case (a) in Figure 2.2).  Additionally, if ߤଵ ൌ Ͳ, then ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ ൌ ߚଵ and two-part pricing reduces to area-based 
pricing.  The results below demonstrate that ܷܵܤͳሺݒሻ has no duality gap and provide link-based UE conditions for 
two-part pricing. 
Lemma 5.4: If ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵκ, where ߚଵ and ߤଵ are both nonnegative, then ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ has no duality gap. 
Proof:  For ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ as given, ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ reduces to 
ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻǣ ݉݅݊ ෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ݓ௞
ݏǤ ݐǤ ܣࢠ௞ ൌ ࡱ௞
ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵ ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞
௔א భ
൑ ݓ௞
ݖ௔௞ א ሼͲǡͳሽǡ ׊ܽ א  Ǥ

The Lagrangian dual problem (or ܦͳሺ࢜ሻሻ of the above can be written as follows: 
ሼܮ௩௞ሺߙଵ௞ሻǣͲ ൑ ߙଵ௞ ൑ ͳሽ 
where ܮ௩௞ሺߙଵ௞ሻ ൌ ߙଵ௞ߚଵ ൅ ሼσ ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖ௔௞௔אఆ ൅ ߙଵ௞ߤଵ σ ݈௔ݖ௔௞௔א భ ǣ ܣࢠ௞ ൌ ࡱ௞ǡ ݖ௔௞ ൒ Ͳሽ. As before, we can replace the 
binary restriction with ݖ௔௞ ൒ Ͳ because ܣ is totally unimodular.  Observe that the second constraint in ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ must 
be hold at equality, i.e., ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵ σ ݈௔ݖ௔௞௔א భ ൌ ݓ௞  in order to minimize the objective function.  Thus, ݓ௞  in the 
objective of ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ can be replaced by ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵ σ ݈௔ݖ௔௞௔א భ  and the problem can be written as  
ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻǣ ݉݅݊ ෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵ ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞
௔א భ
ݏǤ ݐǤ ܣࢠ௞ ൌ ࡱ௞
ݖ௔௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ܽ א  Ǥ

Comparing the two equivalent forms of ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ yields that  
 ൝෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ݓ௞ൡ ൌ  ൝෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜ሻݖ௔௞
௔אఆ
൅ ߤଵ ෍ ݈௔ݖ௔௞
௔א భ
ൡ ൅ ߚଵ ൌ ܮ௩௞ሺͳሻ 
Thus, ߙଵ௞ ൌ ͳ is optimal to the Lagrangian dual problem and the objective values of ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ and its Lagrangian 
dual problem are the same, i.e., there is no duality gap.  
Theorem 5.5:  Let ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵκ.  Then, a pair ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ א ܸ௫ is in tolled UE if and only if there exist ࣋௞ and 
ࣁ௞ such the following link-based conditions hold: 
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ߤଵ݈௜௝ ൅ ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞൯ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א  ଵǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൐ Ͳ ሺͷǤʹ͸ሻ
ߤଵ݈௜௝ ൅ ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞൯ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א  ଵǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൌ Ͳ ሺͷǤʹ͹ሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞൯ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א  ଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൐ Ͳ ሺͷǤʹͺሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߩ௜௞ െ ߩ௝௞൯ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א  ଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݔ௜௝௞ ൌ Ͳ ሺͷǤʹͻሻ
ߚଵ ൅ ࡱ௞்࣋௞ ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻǡ ׊݇ א ܭǡ ࢞௞ ് Ͳ ሺͷǤ͵Ͳሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߛ௜௞ െ ߛ௝௞൯ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א  ଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݕ௜௝௞ ൐ Ͳ ሺͷǤ͵ͳሻ
ݏ௜௝ሺ࢜ሻ െ ൫ߛ௜௞ െ ߛ௝௞൯ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ א  ଶǡ ݇ א ܭǣ ݕ௜௝௞ ൌ Ͳ ሺͷǤ͵ʹሻ
ࡱ௞்ࢽ௞ ൌ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞ሻǡ ׊݇ א ܭǡ ࢟௞ ് Ͳ ሺͷǤ͵͵ሻ
 
Proof: The result follows directly from Theorem 5.2 and Lemma 5.5.  When applying Theorem 5.2 to the case 
where ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵκ, observe that there is no ߙଶ௞Ǥ  In addition, the argument in Lemma 5.5 shows that ߙଵ௞ ൌ ͳ 
solves ܦʹሺ࢜ሻ in condition (5.9) of Theorem 5.2.  
Observe that (5.26) – (5.33) are the KKT conditions of the following optimization problem or the tolled UE 
problem under two-part pricing (TUE2): 
 
ܷܶܧʹǣ ݉݅݊ ෍ න ݏ௔ሺݖሻ݀ݖ
σ ௫ೖೌೖ
଴௔א భ
൅ ෍ න ݏ௔ሺݖሻ݀ݖ
σ ௫ೖೌା௬ೖೌೖ
଴௔א మ
െ෍න ܦ௞ିଵሺݖሻ݀ݖ
ఙೖାఎೖ
଴௞א௄
൅ߚଵ෍ߪ௞
௞א௄
൅ ߤଵ ෍ ෍ ݈௔ݔ௔௞
௞א௄௔א భ
ݏǤ ݐǤ ሾܣଵǣ ܣଶሿݔ௞ െ ܧ௞ߪ௞ ൌ Ͳǡ ׊݇ א ܭ
ሾͲǣ ܣଶሿݕ௞ െ ܧ௞ߟ௞ ൌ Ͳǡ ǡ ׊݇ א ܭ
ݔ௞ǡ ݕ௞ǡ ߪ௞ǡ ߟ௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ǡ ׊݇ א ܭ

 
In the objective, the first three terms are convex functions and represent the objective function of a problem for 
finding a (toll-free) UE flow-demand pair when demands are elastic.  The last two terms determine the total toll 
collected in two parts, the access and VMT fee.  The first two constraints are flow-balance constraints for users who 
pay, ߪ௞ǡ and do not pay toll, ߟ௞ .  By letting ࣋௞  and ࢽ௞  be the multiplier vectors associated with the first two 
constraints, it is straightforward to show that the KKT conditions of the above problem reduce to conditions (5.26) – 
(5.33). Thus, the solution to the above problem yields a UE flow-demand pair ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ under two-part pricing, where 
࢜ ൌ σ ࢞௞ ൅ ࢟௞௞א௄  and ݀௞ ൌ ߪ௞ ൅ ߟ௞. 
As stated above, ܷܶܧʹ involves no path flow (or ௥݂௞) and is a linearly constrained convex program, a problem 
that can be solved by commercial software such as CONOPT (see, e.g., Drud et al., 2002).  To illustrate that 
standard algorithms in the literature with some modifications are applicable to ܷܶܧʹ, we state the Frank-Wolfe 
algorithm as it applies to ܷܶܧʹ in the Appendix. 
6. Finding Optimal Nonlinear Tolling Schemes 
For the tolling function based on ܶ௠௔௫ሺڄሻ, the problem of finding an optimal nonlinear tolling scheme can be 
formulated as follows: 
ܰܮܶǣ  ෍න ܦ௞ିଵሺ߯ሻ݀߯
ௗೖ
଴௞א௄
െ ݏሺ࢜ሻ்࢜
Ǥ Ǥ ߚଵǡ ߚଶǡ ߤଵǡ ߤଶ
ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ א ܸ௙
ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻϐሺʹǤͳሻ െ ሺʹǤͶሻ
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The objective of the above is to maximize the social benefit.  In the constraints, restrictions on the four pricing 
parameters depend on the pricing function of interest.  For example, setting ߚଶǡ ߤଵ, and ߤଶ to zero and allowing ߚଵ to 
be in the interval ሾͲǡ ߚଵ௠௔௫ሿ yield an area-based pricing scheme.  On the other hand, setting ߚଶ and ߤଶ to zero and 
allowing ߚଵ and ߤଵ to be in the intervals ሾͲǡ ߚଵ௠௔௫ሿ and ሾͲǡ ߤଵ௠௔௫ሿ, respectively, would generate a two-part pricing 
scheme instead.  The remaining constraints ensure that the flow-demand pair is feasible and satisfies the tolled UE 
conditions.  In words, ܰܮܶ finds a set of pricing parameters such that the associated UE flow-demand pair yields the 
maximum social benefit.   
As stated, ܰܮܶ is a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (see, e.g., Luo et al., 1996), a class of 
optimization problems generally difficult to solve.  However, ܰܮܶ  contains at most four main decision 
variablesthe pricing parameters.  The other variables ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ react to or are induced by the pricing parameters via 
the last two set of constraints.  As such, ܰܮܶ can be solved approximately using a coordinate search technique (see, 
e.g., Bazaraa et al., 2006), one that sequentially searches for an optimal solution one decision variable (or 
coordinate) at a time.  Because the feasible region of ܰܮܶ is not convex, search and other algorithms in nonlinear 
programming typically produce locally optimal solutions.  For techniques that yield globally optimal solutions, see, 
e.g., Rinnooy Kan et al. (1989). 
In the coordinate search algorithm below, ܷܶܧሺߚଵǡ ߚଶǡ ߤଵǡ ߤଶሻ denotes the ܷܶܧ problem in Section 4 with the 
pricing function based on ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ ൌ ሼߚଵ ൅ ߤଵκǡ ߚଶ ൅ ߤଶκሽ.  The algorithm assumes that ߚଵ א ሾͲǡ ߚଵ௠௔௫ሿǡ ߤଵ א
ሾͲǡ ߤଵ௠௔௫ሿǡ ߚଶ א ሾͲǡ ߚଶ௠௔௫ሿ and ߤଶ א ሾͲǡ ߤଶ௠௔௫ሿ. 
 
Coordinate Search Algorithm 
 
Step 1: Set ሺߚଵଵǡ ߚଶଵǡ ߤଵଵǡ ߤଶଵሻ ൌ ሺͲǡͲǡͲǡͲሻ and ݉ ൌ ͳ. 
Step 2: Let ߚଵ௠ାଵ solves the following problem: 
 ൝෍න ܦ௞ିଵሺ߯ሻ݀߯
ௗೖ
଴௞א௄
െ ݏሺ࢜ሻ்࢜ǣ Ͳ ൑ ߚଵ ൑ ߚଵ௠௔௫ǡ ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ א ܸ௙ǡ ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻܷܶܧሺߚଵǡ ߚଶ௠ǡ ߤଵ௠ǡ ߤଶ௠ሻൡ 
Step 3:  Let ߤଵ௠ାଵ solves the following problem: 
 ൝෍න ܦ௞ିଵሺ߯ሻ݀߯
ௗೖ
଴௞א௄
െ ݏሺ࢜ሻ்࢜ǣ Ͳ ൑ ߤଵ ൑ ߤଵ௠௔௫ǡ ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ א ࢂࢌǡ ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻܷܶܧሺߚଵ௠ାଵǡ ߚଶ௠ǡ ߤଵǡ ߤଶ௠ሻൡ 
Step 4:  Let ߚଶ௠ାଵ solves the following problem: 
 ൝෍න ܦ௞ିଵሺ߯ሻ݀߯
ௗೖ
଴௞א௄
െ ݏሺ࢜ሻ்࢜ǣ Ͳ ൑ ߚଶ ൑ ߚଶ௠௔௫ǡ ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ א ࢂࢌǡ ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻܷܶܧሺߚଵ௠ାଵǡ ߚଶǡ ߤଵ௠ାଵǡ ߤଶ௠ሻൡ 
Step 5:  Let ߤଶ௠ାଵ solves the following problem: 
 ൝෍න ܦ௞ିଵሺ߯ሻ݀߯
ௗೖ
଴௞א௄
െ ݏሺ࢜ሻ்࢜ǣ Ͳ ൑ ߤଶ ൑ ߤଶ௠௔௫ǡ ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ א ࢂࢌǡ ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻܷܶܧሺߚଵ௠ାଵǡ ߚଶ௠ାଵǡ ߤଵ௠ାଵǡ ߤଶሻൡ 
Step 6:  If ԡሺߚଵ௠ାଵǡ ߚଶ௠ାଵǡ ߤଵ௠ାଵǡ ߤଶ௠ାଵሻ െ ሺߚଵ௠ǡ ߚଶ௠ǡ ߤଵ௠ǡ ߤଶ௠ሻԡ ൑ ߳, stop and ሺߚଵ௠ାଵǡ ߚଶ௠ାଵǡ ߤଵ௠ାଵǡ ߤଶ௠ାଵሻ solves ܰܮܶ 
approximately.  Otherwise, set ݉ ൌ ݉ ൅ ͳ and return to Step 2. 
 
In Step 1, it is also possible to use other values for ሺߚଵଵǡ ߚଶଵǡ ߤଵଵǡ ߤଶଵሻ.  The problems in Steps 2 – 5 essentially have 
only one decision variable, i.e., they can be viewed as line search problems and there are many line search 
algorithms in the literature (see, e.g., Bazaraa et al., 2006), all of which guarantee a globally optimal solution under 
some assumptions.  In our implementation below, we solve, e.g., the ܷܶܧሺߚଵǡ ߚଶ௠ǡ ߤଵ௠ǡ ߤଶ௠ሻ problem in Step 2 by SD 
to obtain UE flow-demand pairs at 20 equally spaced ߚଵ-values in the interval ሾͲǡ ߚଵ௠௔௫ሿ and choose one whose UE 
flow-demand pair ሺ࢜ǡ ࢊሻ yields the best social benefit, i.e., σ ׬ ܦ௞ିଵሺ߯ሻ݀߯
ௗೖ
଴௞א௄ െ ݏሺ࢜ሻ
்࢜, as the solution to the 
problem in Step 2.  The procedures for Steps 3 – 5 are similar.  The order in which to optimize the pricing 
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parameters in Steps 2 – 5 is heuristic.  Other orderings are possible and may lead to a faster convergence.  In Step 6, 
the algorithm terminates when the change between two consecutive solutions is small.  
7. Numerical Examples 
Using GAMS (Brooks et al., 1992), we implemented the SD algorithm in Section 4 to find tolled UE flow-
demand pairs for some nonlinear pricing functions and used the coordinate search in Section 6 to find the pricing 
parameters whose associated UE flow-demand pair maximizes the social benefit.  The CPU times reported below 
are from a 2 GHz Dell Computer with 2037 MB of RAM.  The network used for all results below is displayed in 
Figure 7.1 and it has 36 OD pairs and a (disconnected) tolling area as shown.   
The travel time function for each link is of the form ݏ௔ሺݒ௔ሻ ൌ ௔ܶሺͳ ൅ ͲǤͳͷሺݒ௔ ܿ௔Τ ሻସሻ, where the values of ௔ܶ and 
ܿ௔ are randomly selected from the intervals (5, 20) and (50, 100), respectively.  The demand function for every OD 
pair is linear, i.e., ܦ௞ሺݐሻ ൌ ܽ௞ ൅ ܾ௞ݐ, where ܽ௞  and ܾ௞  are randomly chosen.  For each ݇ א ܭǡ we first choose a 
demand, ݀௞ǡ randomly from the interval (10, 30) and let ߬௞ଵ  and ߬௞ଶ  denote, respectively, the free-flow and user-
equilibrium travel time.  The latter assumes that the demand is fixed and equals ݀௞ .  Then, ܽ௞  and ܾ௞  are the 
intercept and slope of the line that passes through two points, ሺ߬௞ଵǡ ߤ݀௞ሻ and (߬௞ଶǡ ݀௞ሻ, where ߤ is a random number 
between 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 7.1: Network for area-based pricing 
 
Table 7.1 displays the information about each iteration of simplicial decomposition for the TUE problem with 
ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ ൌ ݉ܽݔሼͲǤ͵ͷκǡ ͶǤͲ ൅ ͲǤͷκሽ.  As explained in Section 3, we solved ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜ሻ and ܷܵܤʹܽሺ࢜ሻ instead of the 
subproblem in Step 2 of the SD algorithm.  On average, doing so reduces the CPU time by approximately 30% to 
50%.  In addition to the CPU times for solving the master and subproblem, the table provides at the end of each 
iteration the objective value of TUE, the average number of paths generated for each OD pair, and the maximum 
relative gap among all OD pairs.  Using the notation from the algorithm in Section 4, the relative gap for OD pair ݇ 
at the end of iteration ݊ is ൫ܿ௞ െ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௡ሻ൯ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௡ሻΤ .  For the network in Figure 7.1, SD requires only six iterations 
to find a solution to the TUE problem with a small relative gap.  This is similar to the results in Hearn et al. (1987).  
 
origins destinations 
links in the tolling area 
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Table 7.1: Simplicial Decomposition for the TUE problem with ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ ൌ ሼͲǤ͵ͷκǡ ͶǤͲ ൅ ͲǤͷκሽ 
Max. CPU Times (sec.) 
Iter. Obj. Val. Ave. Path Rel. Gap Master Subproblem 
1 -29842.85 1.00 1.0475 0.01 0.24 
2 -42081.20 1.97 0.5243 0.01 0.28 
3 -45625.04 2.89 0.1819 0.02 0.51 
4 -46135.80 3.72 0.1334 0.03 0.99 
5 -46317.35 4.06 0.0016 0.03 0.96 
 
We also used the coordinate search algorithm to find the best parameters for two-part pricing, i.e., ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ ൌ
ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵκ, where ߚଵ א ሾͲǡ ͳͲͲሿ and ߤଵ א ሾͲǡ ͷǤͲሿ. (See case (a) in Figure 2.2.) We solved the TUE problem using SD 
and each iteration of the coordinate search for two-part pricing does not require Step 4 and 5 because ߚଶ and ߤଶ are 
zero.  
As displayed in Table 7.2, the coordinate search algorithm requires only four iterations to terminate with 
approximately 27544 in social benefit.  We surmise that the efficiency of the coordinate search is due in part to the 
form of the social benefit as a function of ߚଵ and ߤଵ shown in Figure 7.2.  Although non-convex, the function in this 
figure is unimodal and well suited for the coordinate search.   
 
Figure 7.2: Social benefit from two-part pricing as a function of ߚଵ and ߤଵ 
 
Observe that the first search iteration in Table 7.2 requires significantly more CPU time than the rest and the 
social benefit of the last (or 4th ) iteration is the same as one in the third.  During the first search iteration, evaluating 
the social benefit at a particular set of pricing parameters requires solving a TUE problem with SD, an algorithm that 
must generate paths for every OD pair if suitable ones are not available.  These paths are saved and used in later 
search iterations, during which saved paths are often sufficient for finding a UE flow-demand pair.  Thus, later 
search iterations are typically less intensive computationally.  In iteration 4, the algorithm essentially verifies that 
the stopping criterion in Step 6 is satisfied.  
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Table 7.2: Coordinate search of two-part pricing, ܶ௠௔௫ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߤଵκ 
Iter. ߚଵ ߤଵ Social Benefit CPU (sec.) 
1 38 0.1 27379.62 8.54 
2 34 0.2 27512.64 3.27 
3 32 0.2 27544.09 2.42 
4 32 0.2 27544.09 2.45 
 
For comparison, Table 7.3 displays the results from using the coordinate search algorithm to find the best 
parameters for three-part pricing, i.e., ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ ൌ ሼߤଵκǡ ߚଶሽ.  (See case (b) in Figure 2.2.)  Not counting the last 
iteration whose purpose is to verify the stopping criterion, it took the search algorithm only one iteration to produce 
a solution.  On average, the CPU times in Table 7.3 are significantly larger than those in Table 7.2 because 
ܷܵܤͳሺ࢜௡ሻ for three-part pricing contains binary variables.  On the other hand, three-part pricing achieves a slightly 
higher social benefit, approximately 27802, than two-part pricing.  
We also used the search algorithm to find the best parameters when ܶ௠௔௫ሺκሻ ൌ ሼߤଵκǡ ߚଶ ൅ ߤଶκሽ.  The search 
took more CPU times and did not yield a social benefit better than the one from three-part pricing.  This suggests 
that a more complex pricing structure may not be beneficial for the network in Figure 7.1. 
 
Table 7.3: Coordinate search of three-part pricing, ܶ௠௔௫ ൌ ሼߤଵκǡ ߚଶሽ 
Iter. ߤଵ ߚଶ Social Benefit CPU (sec.) 
1 1.2 38 27801.66 22.06 
2 1.2 38 27801.66 36.63 
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper considers the case where the amounts of toll that users pay varies nonlinearly with the distance they 
travel inside a tolling area.  Instead of allowing any nonlinear function to represent the toll amount, this paper 
assumes that the tolling function is piecewise linear.  According to Wilson (1997), piecewise linear functions can 
realize most of the advantages of general nonlinear functions.  Moreover, when the number of linear pieces is small, 
piecewise linear functions are more practical because they are easier to understand.  Technically, piecewise linear 
functions lead to a UE problem that can be formulated as a convex program and solved using simplicial 
decomposition.  When the zero duality gap assumption holds (e.g., as in the case of two-part pricing), link-based UE 
conditions exist and the UE problem can be stated using link flows.  This eliminates the need to maintain 
information about individual paths and lessens the computational resources required to, e.g., solve the UE problem.  
To illustrate, we implemented a coordinate search algorithm and used it to find pricing functions that maximize the 
social benefit.  A small road network with randomly generated data is used to empirically show how the algorithms 
behave. 
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Appendix 
This appendix presents a modification of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm for solving the tolled UE problem with two-
part pricing or ܷܶܧʹ.  For linearly constrained convex programs, the Frank-Wolfe algorithm begins with an initial 
feasible solution, finds an improving feasible direction by solving a linear program that approximates the original 
problem, and performs a line search along the direction found to obtain an improved solution.  In theory, the 
algorithm repeats these steps until it finds a feasible solution for which no improving feasible direction exists.  
When applied to the toll-free UE problems in the literature, finding an improving feasible direction reduces to 
solving a shortest path problem for each OD pair.  The similar is true when applied to ܷܶܧʹ.  Instead of one, the 
algorithm below solves two shortest path problems for each OD pair, one to obtain a path using the tolling area and 
the other to find one that bypasses it instead. 
The algorithm below applies the Frank-Wolfe algorithm to ܷܶܧʹ with the assumption that ܦ௞ିଵሺͲሻ ൌ ܯ௞ ൏ λ, 
i.e., ܯ௞ is the maximum demand for OD pair ݇. 
Frank-Wolfe Algorithm for TUE2 
 
Step 1: Let ሺ࢞ଵǡ ࢟ଵǡ ࣌ଵǡ ࣁଵሻ א ܸ௫ and set ݉ ൌ ͳ. 
Step 2: Let ሺ࢞ෝǡ ࢟ෝǡ ࣌ෝǡ ࣁෝሻ solve the following (sub)problem: 
 
ܷܵܤ͵௠ǣ  ෍ ሺݏ௔ሺݒ௔௠ሻ ൅ ߤଵ݈௔ሻݔ௔௞
௔א భ
൅ ෍ ݏ௔ሺݒ௔௠ሻሺݔ௔௞ ൅ ݕ௔௞ሻ
௔א మ
൅෍ߚߪ௞
௞א௄
െ෍ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௠ሻሺߪ௞ ൅ ߟ௞ሻ
௞א௄
Ǥ Ǥ ܣଵ࢞ଵ௞ ൅ ܣଶ࢞ଶ௞ ൌ ߪ௞ࡱ௞ǡ ׊݇ א ܭ
ܣଶ࢟ଶ௞ ൌ ߟ௞ࡱ௞ǡ ׊݇ א ܭ
ߪ௞ ൅ ߟ௞ ൑ ܯ௞ǡ ׊݇ א ܭ
ݔ௔௞ǡ ݕ௔௞ǡ ߪ௞ǡ ߟ௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊݇ א ܭǡ ܽ א ߗǤ
 
 
Step 3: If the following holds, stop and ሺ࢞௠ǡ ࢟௠ǡ ࣌௠ǡ ࣁ௠ሻ is optimalǤ  Otherwise, go to Step 4. 
 
෍ሺݏ௔ሺ࢜௠ሻ ൅ ߤଵ݈௔ሻሺݒො௔ െ ݒ௔௠ሻ
௔א భ
൅ ෍ ݏ௔ሺ࢜௠ሻሺݒො௔ െ ݒ௔௠ሻ
௔א మ
൅෍ߚሺߪො௞ െ ߪ௞௠ሻ
௞א௄
െ ࡰି૚ሺࢊ௠ሻ்ሺࢊ෡ െ ࢊ௠ሻ ൒ Ͳ 
 
where ࢊ௠ ൌ ࣌௠ ൅ ࣁ௠ and ࢊ෡ ൌ ࣌ෝ ൅ࣁෝ. 
 
Step 4: Let ߣ௠ א ሾͲǡͳሿ solve the following one-dimensional problem: 

ఒאሾ଴ǡଵሿ
෍ න ሺݏ௔ሺ߯ሻ ൅ ߤଵ݈௔ሻ݀߯
ఒ௩ොೌାሺଵିఒሻ௩೘ೌ
଴௔א భ
൅ ෍ න ݏ௔ሺ߯ሻ݀߯
ఒ௩ොೌାሺଵିఒሻ௩೘ೌ
଴௔א మ
൅ ߚ෍ߣߪො௞ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߣሻߪ௞௠
௞א௄
െ෍න ܦ௞ିଵሺ߯ሻ݀߯
ఒௗ෠ೖାሺଵିఒሻௗೖ೘
଴௞א௄
 
Set ሺ࢞௠ାଵǡ ࢟௠ାଵǡ ࣌௠ାଵǡ ࣁ௠ାଵሻ ൌ ߣ௠ሺ࢞ෝǡ ࢟ෝǡ ࣌ෝǡ ࣁෝሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߣ௠ሻሺ࢞௠ǡ ࢟௠ǡ ࣌௠ǡ ࣁ௠ሻ  and ݉ ൌ ݉ ൅ ͳ .  Return 
to Step 2. 
 
It is possible to let ሺ࢞ଵǡ ࢟ଵǡ ࣌ଵǡ ࣁଵሻ ൌ ሺͲǡ Ͳǡ Ͳǡ Ͳሻ in Step 1.  Problem ܷܵܤ͵௠ in Step 2 is a linear program that 
approximates ܷܶܧʹ around the current solution ሺ࢞௠ǡ ࢟௠ǡ ࣌௠ǡ ࣁ௠ሻ.  The first two constraints in ܷܵܤ͵௠ balance the 
flows at each node for paths that use and do not use the tolling area, respectively.  The third set of constraints 
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ensures that the demands for toll and toll-free routes do not exceed the maximum for each OD pair.  Equivalently, 
ܷܵܤ͵௠ can be written as follows: 
 
ܷܵܤ͵ܽ௠ǣ ݉݅݊ ෍ߨ௞ଵሺߪ௞ሻ െ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௠ሻߪ௞
௞א௄
൅෍ߨ௞ଶሺߟ௞ሻ െ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௠ሻߟ௞
௞א௄
ݏǤ ݐǤ ߪ௞ ൅ ߟ௞ ൑ ܯ௞ǡ ׊݇ א ܭ
ߪ௞ǡ ߟ௞ ൒ Ͳǡ ׊݇ א ܭ
 
 
where, for each ݇ א ܭ, 
 
ߨ௞ଵሺߪ௞ሻ ൌ ߚߪ௞ ൅  ൝෍ሺݏ௔ሺݒ௔௠ሻ ൅ ߤଵ݈௔ሻݔ௔௞
௔אఆ
ǣ ܣ࢞௞ ൌ ߪ௞ࡱ௞ǡ ݔ௞ ൒ Ͳൡǡ 
ߨ௞ଶሺߟ௞ሻ ൌ  ൝෍ ݏ௔ሺݒ௔௠ሻݕ௔௞
௔אఆమ
ǣ ܣଶ࢟௞ ൌ ߟ௞ࡱ௞ǡ ݖ௞ ൒ Ͳൡ Ǥ 
 
The minimization problems in the definition of ߨ௞ଵሺߪ௞ሻ and ߨ௞ଶሺߟ௞ሻ are minimum cost flow problems (see, e.g., 
Ahuja et al., 1993).  Because there is no capacity constraint on any link, these minimizations correspond to sending 
ߪ௞ and ߟ௞ along the least-cost path using and not using the tolling area, respectively.   
To solve ܷܵܤ͵ܽ௠ǡ evaluate ߨ௞ଵሺܯ௞ሻ  and ߨ௞ଶሺܯ௞ሻ , i.e., solve two shortest path problems, one using the full 
network and the other bypassing the tolling area, and send ܯ௞ units of flows along each route.  Then, the solution to 
ܷܵܤ͵ܽ௠ is, for each ݇, 
 
ሺߪො௞ǡ ߟƸ௞ሻ ൌ ቐ
ሺͲǡͲሻǡ  ሼߨ௞ଵሺܯ௞ሻǡ ߨ௞ଶሺܯ௞ሻሽ െ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௠ሻܯ௞ ൒ Ͳ
ሺܯ௞ǡ Ͳሻǡ ߨ௞ଵሺܯ௞ሻ ൑ ߨ௞ଶሺܯ௞ሻƬሼߨ௞ଵሺܯ௞ሻǡ ߨ௞ଶሺܯ௞ሻሽ െ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௠ሻܯ௞ ൏ Ͳ
ሺͲǡܯ௞ሻǡ ߨ௞ଶሺܯ௞ሻ ൏ ߨ௞ଵሺܯ௞ሻƬሼߨ௞ଵሺܯ௞ሻǡ ߨ௞ଶሺܯ௞ሻሽ െ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௠ሻܯ௞ ൏ Ͳ
 
 
Then, the corresponding the optimal solution to ܷܵܤ͵௠ is  
 
ሺݔො௞ǡ ݕො௞ǡ ߪො௞ǡ ߟƸ௞ሻ ൌ ቐ
ሺͲǡͲǡͲǡͲሻǡ ሼߨ௞ଵሺܯ௞ሻǡ ߨ௞ଶሺܯ௞ሻሽ െ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௠ሻܯ௞ ൒ Ͳ
ሺݔ௞ǡ Ͳǡܯ௞ǡ Ͳሻǡ ߨ௞ଵሺܯ௞ሻ ൑ ߨ௞ଶሺܯ௞ሻƬሼߨ௞ଵሺܯ௞ሻǡ ߨ௞ଶሺܯ௞ሻሽ െ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௠ሻܯ௞ ൏ Ͳ
ሺͲǡ ݕ௞ǡ Ͳǡܯ௞ሻǡ ߨ௞ଶሺܯ௞ሻ ൏ ߨ௞ଵሺܯ௞ሻƬሼߨ௞ଵሺܯ௞ሻǡ ߨ௞ଶሺܯ௞ሻሽ െ ܦ௞ିଵሺ݀௞௠ሻܯ௞ ൏ Ͳ
 
 
where ݔ௞ and ݕ௞ are optimal solutions to the minimization problems in ߨ௞ଵሺܯ௞ሻ and ߨ௞ଶሺܯ௞ሻ, respectively. 
To obtain a more efficient algorithm, it is also possible to modify or extend the above algorithm via simplicial 
decomposition (see, e.g., Lawphongpanich and Hearn, 1984, Hearn et al., 1987, and Patriksson, 1994). 
 
